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CHURCH, STATE, AND SOCIETY

1

R eflections on the Life of the Church in Contemporary Yugoslavia 1

by Miroslav Volf
Dr. Miroslav Volf (Pentecostal) has received his education in Yugoslavia and his
doctoral degree at Ti.i bingen University, West Germany. H e is a professor at the
Biblical- Theological Institute in Zagreb and Osijek, Yugoslavia and occasionally
teaches at the Fuller Theological Seminary in California. As a tyoung scholar he has
written a number of articles on the Christian- Marxist dialogue and religion in
Yugoslavia.

Socialist societies (in the Marxist- Leninist tradition) are not known for their love of the
Christian faith. And Christian churches (at least traditionally) have shown very little sympathy for
the socialist project. Until recently, the history of their relation was for the most part one of bitter
mutual animosity. Since socialist societies encompass almost half the human race and are here to
stay 2 , and since hundreds of millions of believers continue to make up a significant portion o f the
population of these societies, it is imperative to look for ways in which the mutual hostility which
persists can give way to mutual respect. Both parties seem presently interested in improvement of
the relations, if for no other reasons than because Communists have learned that socialist society
"cannot be constructed either against religious believers nor without them"3 and because believers
have realized that their life projects are inseparably bound to the enduring socialist systems in which
they live.
My intention here is to illuminate some aspects of the struggle over mutual hostility but also
of the striving for mutual respect between the government of the socialist society and Christian
churches in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia provides an interesting case study of the relation between

socialist societies and religious communities. On the one hand, much like other socialist societies,
its political order is defined by the Communist League, and its legal specifications and theoretical
formulations of the relation between religious communities and society are firmly rooted in the
Marxist- Leninist tradition. On the other hand, through its efforts consistently to implement political
and economic self- management, Yugoslavia has become one of the most open socialist societies with

1This article has been originally published in Transformation (Oxford, England), Vol. 6, No. 1
(January- March, 1989), pp. 24-32. Published in OPREE by the permission of the author and editor
of Transformation in a slightly edited form.

one of the m ost l iberal pol icies toward rel igious comm unities in the social ist worl d today. Con
versations with church l eaders from social ist and Third Worl d societies have m ade m e real ize that
Yugosl avia's sol utions to the probl em of the rel ation between churches and state and its ways of
deal ing with still unresol ved issues can be instructive and even paradigm atic for the rel ation between
churches and state in other social ist societies.
·.F irst the rel ation between church and state in Yugosl avia will be anal yzed (S ection II). This
will be foll owed by deal ing with the rel ation between rel igious comm unities and society in
Yugosl avia, an investigation that in m any respects is m ore fruitful than the anal ysis of the rel ation
between churches and state (S ection III). In the next section som e unresol ved issues of the rel ation
between church and state and rel igious comm unities and society will be discussed (S ection IV). The
paper will end with a short refl ection on the possibil ity ofm utuall y enriching co-existence between
Christians and Marxists in a social ist society (S ection V). The treatm ent will be prefaced bym aking
a few l oosel y rel ated introductory comm ents which shoul d m ake the treatm ent m ore intell igibl e.
(S ection I).
I.Introductory Remarks

Trevor Beeson starts the section on Yugosl avia of his cl assical vol um e of rel igious conditions
in theS oviet Union and Eastern Europe, Discretion and Val our, by stating: "Yugosl avia is the despair
of tidy m inds . . . [ its] historical , pol itical, cul tural and rel igious backgrounds com bine to create a
m inefiel d which even the m ost sensitive and well -inform ed comm entator can onl y cross in fear and
trem bl ing."4 In a short articl e it is particul arl y difficul t to do justice to the com pl exities of the
Yugosl avian situation: brevity cannot do without general izations and the Yugosl avian situation does
not suffer general izations.

A com prom ise will be m ade here by indicating in this section the

com pl exity of the situation and in the foll owing sections proceeding with--ge neral izations.
F irst, Yugosl avia is a highly diverse country. Ethnicall y and cul turall y it is hom e to som e 24
ethnic groups, som e sm all er, som e l arger. In Europe Yugosl avia is the pl ace where East intersects
with West. Rel igiousl y it com prises three l arger distinct rel igious bodies (Isl am, Orthodoxy, and
Rom an Cathol icism ) and num erous sm all er Protestant Christian comm unities. It m ay com e as a
surprise to som e that Yugosl avia is characterized al so pol iticall y by a rel ativel y high degree of
decentral ization, so that l ocal governm ents exert significant infl� ence on both national pol icies and
the l ives of the peopl e within their jurisdiction.5
Even within one l ocal ity one finds a significant degree of pl ural ism . For instance, in his
dissertation on the social rol e of rel igion in Yugosl avia, Geral d S henk has anal yzed the situation i n
the Republ ic o f Croatia and discovered that three m ain positions o n the social rol e of rel igious
comm unities exist sim ul taneousl y: "a cl ear and som etim es strident negative perspective," am oderate
or "som ewhat l ess negative than the form er, traditional official view," and a positive (though not
uncritical ) view m aintaining that "society has a positive publ ic interest in rel igion."6
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S econd, as is generally recognized, Yugoslavia is presently in a deep crisis. Zdenko Roter,
the dean of theS chool ofS ociology, PoliticalS cience, and Journalism of the University of Ljubljana,
m aintains that the crisis
cannot be considered tem porary or m om entary, or a crisis resulting m erely from the
departure of a charism atic leader, which Josip Broz-Tito undoubtedly was, from the
historical stage. Rather, this is a 'long wave' crisis, deep and structural. It
encom passes all sectors of societal and individual existence, from the econom y,
culture, and education to politics, m orality, and relig ion. Individual and social life
as a whole is disturbed. Relationships, standards, and values, previously considered
unquestionable and perm anent, have b een destroyed.7
The crisis itself is, of course, not a purely negative phenom enon, for it can function as a catalyst for
significant positive social changes.

But because it puts things in a state of flux, crisis creates

problem s for social analysts because it hinders not only accurate descriptions of the present situation,
but m akes it also nearly im possible to predict future developm ents.
II. Churches and State

One can divide the history of the relation between churches and state in Yugoslavia in
various ways.8 Here a very sim ple perio dization will suffice: first, a period of confrontation
imm ediately after the liberation of the country until the early fifties, and second, a period of
increased accomm odation between the churches and state after the early fifties. The first period
corresponds roughly to the initial years of S talinist influence on Yugoslavian internal policies, and
the second, to the years of indigenous attem pts at theoretical developm ent and · practical
im plem entation of self-m anagem ent.
Confrontation of the Post-War Years.

After World War II when new Yugoslavia received its first constitution, "the pattern was
derived from theS oviet constitution of 1936. The personal freedom s of religion, speech, association
and assem bly, looked no better (nor worse) on paper than the form al guarantees available under
S talin."9 Article 25 of the Constitution--which is alm ost identical with Article 174 of the m ost
recent Constitution ( 197 4 )--p rovided that:
(I ) Citizens are guaranteed freedom of conscience and of religious profession.
(2) The church is separated from the state.
(3) Religious comm unities whose teaching is not contrary to the Constitution are
free in their religious affairs and in perform ing religious services. Religious schools
for the preparation of priests are free, and com e under the general oversight of the
state.
( 4) Abuse of the church and faith for political purposes and the existence of.
political organizations on a religious basis are forbidden.
(5) The state m ay m aterially assist religious comm unities.
As the relation between churches and state is form ulated in the 1946 Constitution, it clearly
expresses one of the m ain principles of the Marxist-Leninist approach to religious comm unities: the
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legal separation of church and state whichm akes religion the private affair of every citizen. In spite
of the form ulation that "Religious comm unities . . . are free in their religious affairs," the legislation
was interpreted not only as barring the political activity of religious comm unities but also as
prohibiting any appearance of re ligion on the public scene. Religion had to rem ain locked in the
private, spiritual cham bers of individuals' lives, ' religious service' being technically the only occa
sion when a believer could show that as a believer she or he is a social being. Religious liberty could
thus have only a narrow m eaning:

the freedom to believe or not to believe and the freedom to
participate or not to participate in the liturgical life of the church.10
The second principle of the Marxist-Leninist approach to religious comm unities was
im plem ented as vigorously as the first. The principle states that the task of Comm unists as the
vanguard of the working classes is to assist actively in what is considered the inevitable fading away
of religion.U If religion were only an opiate of the people, as Marx claim ed, then it would be suffi
cient to work on transform ing the alienating circum stances which m ake people hunger for religion.
But Marxists have com e to consider religion also an opiate for the people. Hence one needs to fight
against religious superstitions which people were fed in order to num b them to exploitation and
satisfy them with present conditions.
Despite the constitutional protection of the freedom of religion, zealous governm ent officials,
especially at the local level, m ounted an all-out attack on the churc hes, both ideologically and
adm inistratively. The goal was clearly to liberate people from religious superstitions and create new
atheists. Harsh m easures were undertaken against religious institutions and individuals, including
im prisonm ents, incitem ent ofm ob violence and destruction of property. In fact President Tito had
to call for a halt to physical assaults on clergy in a public speech in Rum a in 1952, and a top
governm ent official, Eduard Kardelj, had to underline to partym em bers that there is a distinction
between the anti-state political activity of som e clergy and the convictions of religious people.12
But the sharpness of the confrontation between churches and state in Y ugoslavia imm ediately
after World War II cannot be explained sim ply by Marxist-Leninist theory. In a num ber of ways
the churches contributed significantly to the restricted role of religious comm unities in post-war
Y ugoslavia. First, the largest churches had a privileged position in the "Kingdom of S erbs, Croats
andS lovenes and later in the so-called "Old Y ugoslavia." Unbelief "was itself an offense punishable
by the state. As convinced atheists would have been acutely aware, the bureaucratic regulation of
such im portant life stages as birth,m arriage, and death was in the hands of religious officials."13
S econd, there was a very pronounced anti-comm unist and anti-socialist attitude on the part
of the churches. Before and during the war ecclesiastical bodies were adam ant in their condem nation
not only of the "godless bolshevism," but of all "ideologies and social system s which are not founded
on the eternal principles of revelation and Christianity." For som e years after the warm any churches
were then "not able to accept realistically . . . the victory of the socialist revolution"' and continued
to fight it or hope for its downfall.14
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II.15

Third, c hurc he sc oll aborate d with Nazi force s and partic ipate d in fratric ide during Worl d War
"The outbre ak of Worl d War II and fore ign occ upation provide d a c ove r for nume rous ol d

sc ore s to be se ttle d in unim aginabl y vic ious ways . . A part of the rel igious hie rarc hy ine ac h of the
.

l arge c omm unitie s was visibl y and publ icl y im pl ic ate d in atroc itie sc omm itte d in c omm unal viole nce
during the war."16
Modus Vivendi

Though the re we re signific ant eleme nts in the c hurc he s whic h c ontinue d to think of the
c hurc he s as against or al ongside soc ial ism, but not in soc ial ism, 17 as a w hole the c hurc he s sl owl y
adjuste d to the ne w soc ial ist soc ie ty. S oc ial ist soc ie ty itsel f, though not l ac king in "sec tarian
eleme nts, " as the y are c alle d in Yugosl avia, has al so prove n to be de vel oping in the direc tion of
inc re ase d dem oc ratization. De spite te nsions be twee nc hurc he s and state whic hc ontinue d toe xist (c f.
Sec tion IV), afte r the e arl y fiftie s the ir rel ations as a rule starte d sl owl y to be de sc ribe d both by
c hurc h le ade rs and publ ic offic ial s as "ge ne rall y c orrec t."18 Espec iall y in the sixtie s, c hurc he s and
state e nte re d a pe riod of de te nte .
In the c oncl usion of his disse rtation Ge ral d S he nk give s a hel pful summ ary of the pre se nt
parame te rs in whic h c hurc he s are e xpec te d to ope rate in Yugosl avia. He state s that
the boundary be twee n rel igion and the l arge r soc ie ty in Yugosl avia at pre se nt appe ars
to be drawn to incl ude:

(I) substantial autonom y in l iturgic al affairs, within de signate d publ ic fac il itie s;

(2) substantial autonom y in selec tion and training of rel igious le ade rs;
(3) e xte nsive publ ic ation ac tivitie s (and distribution through publ ic book store s); 1 9
(4) rel igious e duc ation for c hil dre n, o n a vol untary basis, o n rel igious prem ise s;
(5)ec ume nical c ontac ts and dial ogue am ong the dive rse c onstitue nt groups (at horne
and abroad);
(6) othe r, non-institutional ize d ac tivitie s, suc h as ge ne ral m oral instruc tion and
soc ial ization of youth, and pre se rvation of the rel igious eleme nts in the ge ne ral
c ul tural he ritage, e spec iall y of distinc t e thnic groups.

But the pre se nt boundary e xcl ude s:

(I) publ ic invol veme nt by rel igious le ade rs in pol itic al affairs, on any othe r basis
than the ir individual c itize nship;
(2) rel igious invol veme nt in selec tion of ge ne ral e duc ational c urric ul um c onte nt in
publ ic sc hool s;
(3) rel igious ope ration of institutions for soc ial wel fare, or forec onom ic produc tion;
(4) rel igion as an arbite r of sec ul ar c ul ture and publ ic m oral ity;
(5) Rel igion as de fe nde r of the pol itic al and c ul tural inte re sts of a partic ul are thnic
group or re gion against the inte re sts of soc ie ty as a whole . 20
III. Christians and Society

Some Distinctions

If we c once ntrate our inve stigation on the rel ation be twee n c hurc he s and state our atte ntion
will be foc use d on the history ofc onfl ic ts and acc omm odations be twee n two se ts of bure auc rats, the
5

hi erarc hy of religi ous org ani zati ons and the admi ni strati ve apparatus of the g overnment. 21 But
soci ali st soci eti es are noti dentic al wi th g overnmental apparatuses and c hurc hes are not one and the
same as thei r hi erarc hi es .
Wi th respec t to ci vi l c ommuni ty, w e have t o di fferenti ate c arefully between state and
22
soci ety.
State (res publica) refers to the formal, public org ani zati on of the soci ety for purposes of
g overnm ent, soci ety (civitas) to the sum-total of ci ti zens and thei r nong overnmental org ani zati ons
and ac ti vi ti es. 23 I t i s true that most Marxi sts have deni ed the c onc eptual separati on of state and
soci ety. Yet, at least i n Yug oslavi a, some phi losophers and poli tic al sci enti sts are slowly c omi ng to
reali ze that there i s a sphere of responsi ble soci al ac ti on that does not nec essari ly i nfri ng e on the
poli tic al realm. 24
Wi th respec t to the ecc lesi al c ommuni ty we have to make a parallel di sti nc ti on between
c hurc hes as i nsti tuti ons headed by thei r leadershi p and i ndi vi dual beli evers whic h c onsti tute
Chri sti an c ommuni ti es. Suc h a di sti nc ti on allows i nvolvement of Chri sti ans i n the political, and not
merely soci al, realm. They partici pate i n the poli tic al proc esses not i n the name of thei r respec ti ve
c hurc hes, but i n thei r own name, bri ngi ng i nto the poli tic al arena c ommunally medi ated Chri sti an
values whic h have shaped them not only as Chri sti ans but as human bei ng s. 25
I f no di sti nc ti on i s made between state and soci ety and between c hurc hes asi nsti tuti ons and
as c ommuni ti es of i ndi vi dual beli evers, i t i s i mpossi ble for c hurc hes to c onc eptuali ze and prac tic e
thei r prophetic role i n soci ety- -"the preac hi ng of the whole g ospel of God's g rac e, whic h as suc h i s
the whole justi fic ati on of the whole man, i nc ludi ng poli tic al man" 26 - - wi thout seemi ng to assert
themselves asc ompeti tors wi th the state for poli tic al power. Furthermorei f suc h di sti nc ti ons are not
made, the ac tual soci ali nfluenc e of Chri sti an c ommuni ti es i n soci ali st soci eti es wi ll probably esc ape
our notic e. Despi te the pronounc ed attempts to loc k Chri sti an fai th i n the pri vate c hambers of
i ndi vi duals' li ves, g overnments of soci ali st soci eti es have always ac tually treated religi on as havi ng
some soci al func ti on.
I n the followi ng sec ti onsc ontai ns a bri ef di sc uss how some Marxi stsi n Yug oslavi a havec ome
not only to rec og ni ze the ac tual public func ti on of religi on but also to value the posi ti ve role that
authentic Chri sti an fai th c an play i n the li fe of a soci ali st soci ety.
Change of Climate

I n the late seventi es and eig hti es i t bec ame apparent that sec ulari zati on i n soci ali st soci eti es,
i nc ludi ng Yug oslavi a, was not advanci ng as fast as most Communi sts had hoped and most Chri sti ans
had feared. As soci ologic ali nvestig ati ons show, sec ulari zati on slowed down markedly, possi bly even
halted, gi vi ng way to the proc ess of the revi tali zati on of religi on. 27 The Yug oslavi an g overnment's
reac ti on to the resurg enc e of religi on was not to step up i deologic al propag anda and admi ni strati ve
measures to c ontrol and suppress the religi on. R ather i t showed c onc ern to mai ntai n and develop
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g ood rel ations with rel ig iousc ommunities. O ne important exampl e of thisc onc ern is the inc reasingl y
positive way in whic h the mass media in rec ent years has treated rel ig ious c ommunities.28
O ne reason for the rel ativel y positive attitude of the state toward rel ig ious c ommunities in
Yug osl avia is c ertainl y sig nific ant advanc es in the democ ratization of the soc iety over the past
dec ade. I n the foll owing two additional reasons whic h have al so served to pave the way for the
apprec iation of the positive soc ial func tion of Christian faith will be el aborated. The sec ond reason
is radic al c hang es that have happened in the R oman Cathol ic Churc h- -in many respec ts the c ruc ial
rel ig ious c ommunity in Yug osl avia--during Vatic an I I and the appearanc e of the theol og ies of
l iberation. The doc uments of Vatic an I I , in partic ul ar Gaudium et spes, stressed dial og ue with and
partic ipation in the modern worl d. I t opened thec hurc h for the outside worl d, thus sig nall ing an end
to an era of fierc e attac ks ag ainst modern devel opments made from behind hig h eccl esial wall s. The
appearanc e ofl iberation theol og ies testified to Marxists about the will of atl east some Christians to
make their c onc ern about justic e c onc rete.

As Yug osl av Marxist Nikol a Skl edar states, these

devel opments in the R oman Cathol ic and P rotestant c hurc hes c reated a basis "for dial og ue and
c ooperation (of the c hurc hes) with c ontemporary Marxism in c reating c onditions for free and
universal prog ress and devel opment of human being s. " 29
The third reason for thec hang ed cl imate in rel ation to rel ig iousc ommunities is the infl uenc e
of phil osophers' return to the orig inal Marx and soc iol og ic al study of rel ig ion. I n their searc h to free
themsel ves from Stal inist dog matism Yug osl avian Marxists g raduall y abandoned the typic al Soviet
approac h to rel ig ion as an opiate for the people and substituted for it Marx' understanding of rel ig ion
as the opiate of the people. H enc e the proper attitude toward rel ig ion was not so muc h direc t as
indirec t struggl e ag ainst it:

one shoul d strive to el iminate al ienation in ec onomic and pol itic al

spheres whic h provides fertil e soil for the wil d g rowth of rel ig ious superstitions. The redisc overy
of the orig inal Marx was l ater suppl emented by a c onsistent soc iol og ic al study of rel ig ion. Earl y
soc iol og ic al investig ations treated rel ig ion under the rubric of al ienation, but in more rec ent years
young er Marxist soc iol og ists have sugg ested that rel ig ion is not essentiall y al ienating . As a form of
humanc ul tural produc tionc aused by al ienating c irc umstanc es, why woul d rel ig ion not be as "c apabl e
of surv iving the c onditions and the reasons of its orig in as other soc ial produc ts" have,30 they asked.
I n fac t, shoul d not Marxists (as well as Christians) expec t in c ommunism not a disappearanc e but
a refinement of rel ig ion?

"As far as rel ig ion and its future is c onc erned," write two young er

Yug osl av Marxists,
we c an suppose that it will bec ome more and more deinstitutional ized, individual ized
(not privatized! ), and personal in the l ong proc ess of prog ressive historic al -soc ial
c hang e. As a form of spirit it will bec ome more and more a worl d of poetic imag es
of the metaphysic al butc onnec ted with . . . [ the] l iberation of man and of [ the] entire
soc iety . . Can one not say of it [religion] that it appears as alienation only in
certain historical situations and forms? Could it not in its struggle for a sgiritually
transformed future exist, like art, in an unalienated, creative, human form? 1
.

.
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Suc h formulations about the nature of relig ion, Christian faith inc luded, may not satisfy
Christians as theolog ic al proposals,32 but they are sig nific ant advanc es in Marxist valuation of reli
g ion. T houg h suc h views are c learly radic al for the majority of g overnment offic ials, their less
radic al forms have exerc ised sig nific ant influenc e on g overnment polic ies and the g eneral public 's
perspec tives on relig ious dynamic s.

Thus the way has been paved for the first steps toward an

apprec iation of the positive soc ial role of relig ion.
Positive Social Function of Religion

Talk about the soc ial utility of relig ion in soc ialist soc ieties mig ht be taken as a c ase in point
of the "c ultural manag ement" thoug ht to be c harac teristic of these soc ieties.

But whether the

rec og nition of the public utility of relig ion "is to be equated with the instrumental use of relig ion for
politic al ends depends on how well that relig ious c ontribution is envisioned in acc ordanc e with what
the relig ious c ommunities themselves want to provide to the larg er soc iety."33 H enc e Marxists' talk
about the soc ial utility of Christian faith will c onstitute a sig nific ant advanc e over their neg ative
valuation of relig ion only if they perc eive the soc ial utility of Christian faith to be based on
authentic Christian values as interpreted by Christian c ommunities. Althoug h the g overnments of
soc ialist soc ieties c onstitutionally exc luded relig ion from the public sphere, it c ould not esc ape their
attention that relig ious bodies by their very existenc e func tion as Pt1 blic ac tors.

Moreover they

desired the c ooperation of relig ious c ommunities and their leaders (prec isely as relig ious leaders, not
merely as responsible c itizens! ) in building soc ialist soc iety.34 T his is best illustrated by the fac t
that prominent relig ious leaders have rec eived state awards in soc ialist soc ieties.35 But the positive

soc ial role of relig ion was perc eived as a rule to c onsist either in "avoidanc e of prosc ribed behaviors"
or in "externalc ooperation between established relig ious leaders and established politic al authorities"
and had "virtually nothing to do with the internal values of relig ions" and henc e was not based on
approval of "distinc tively relig ious ac tivities deemed as soc ially benefic ia1 ."36 Bec ause g overnments
of soc ialist soc ieties did not show apprec iation for authentic relig ious values, the statec ouldc ontinue
the apparently c ontradic tory prac tic e of polemic izing ag ainst neg ative soc ial c onsequenc es inherent
to relig ious beliefs and public ly awarding relig ious leaders.
During the past dec ade in partic ular in Yug oslavia there has been an inc reasing apprec iation
of the soc ial utility of authentic Christian values. The unthinking rec ital of the c lassic al Marxist
tenet that all relig ions inhibit human development is g iving way to an apprec iation of the
c ontribution whic h relig ion, and in partic ular Christian faith, c an make toward the realization of
authentic humanity and the full emanc ipation of soc iety. R ec og nition of the positive soc ial func tion
of Christian faith rang es from timid admission "that in some of its aspec ts relig ion c an transform
itself so as to foster human development more than it hinders it,"37 to the bold statement that the
beliefs of a c hurc h whic h "remains faithful to the basic biblic al messag es in the c ontemporary world
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and soci ety," whic h teac hes and prac tic es forgi veness, and i s a bearer of the desi re for merc y, and
l ove, are c ompati bl e wi th the val ues of Yug osl av sel f-managi ng soci ali sm.38
Suc h perspec ti ves on the posi ti ve soci al rol e of Chri sti an fai th i n soci ali st soci ety are still
more or l ess pri vate vi ews of i ndi vi dual Marxi sts i n Yug osl avi a. They have yet to be transl ated
i nto c onsi stent g overnmental polici es. As a soci ol ogi st wi th a strong i nterest i n religi on, Srdjan
Vrc an wri tes that the system still "undertakes to prevent any possi bili ty that religi on c oul d bec ome
soci all y or poli tic all y sig ni fic ant."39 But "the system" seems to be sl owl y c hangi ng , too. I n a rec ent
speec h a top g overnment offici al i n Croati a, J osi p Zmajic , poi nted out that i n the c ontext of a
c onsi stent separati on between c hurc h and state "religi ous c ommuni ti es have their own func ti on,
mi ssi on, and a share of responsi bili ty in our society and with our people. After all , dail y li fe i tsel f·
remi nds us that religi ousc ommuni ti es, religi on and soci ali st sel f-managi ng soci ety not onl yc an exi st
al ong eac h other, but that they c an and must c ooperate c onstruc ti vel y wi th one another."40
IV. Some Unresolved Issues

There are a number of unresol ved i ssues i n the rel ati on between c hurc hes and state whic h
are presentl y hotl y debated i n Yug osl avi a. The openness i tsel f i n whic h the debate i s taki ng pl ac e
i ndic ates the l evel of democ rati zati on i n Yug osl avi a today. For Chri sti ans i n Yug osl avi a the deg ree
of openness i s i n some respec ts even more sig ni fic ant than the i mmedi ate posi ti ve resul ts of the
debate.
Some of the unresol ved i ssues will be hig hlig hted whic h are perc ei ved mosti mportant by the
religious communities. Thi s will , ofc ourse, make the di sc ussi on one-si ded. To c ounterac t thi s one

si dedness one woul d have to address the unresol vedi ssues betweenc hurc hes and state whic h the state
c onsi ders i mportant. Spac e, however, permi ts onl y to enumerate some of these.
Fi rst, c hurc hes are perc ei ved as rel uc tant to acc ept the l egi ti mac y of soci ali st soci ety and to
supporti ts efforts to humani ze li fe; they are seen as bei ng ei ther ag ai nst soci ali sm or exi sti ng merel y
"al ong si de of" i t, even, i n worst c ases, func ti oni ng as reposi tori es of opposi ti on.
Sec ond, religi ous c ommuni ti es are c harg ed wi th rel uc tanc e to rec og ni ze and acc ept as
l egi ti mate "the i deol ogic al autonomy of other g roups i n a pl urali st soci ety."

Thi rd, they are suspec ted of unwilli ng ness to acc ept "the autonomy of the poli tic al order"41

and of stri vi ng to rec apture former pri vil eg ed posi ti ons.
Fourth, there i s c onc ern on the part of the state that c hurc hes are fosteri ng separati st ethnic
senti ments whic h threaten the i nteg ri ty of the nati on.
Fi fth, therei s a fear thati nternati onal c ontac ts ofc hurc hes may be mani pul ated by poli tic al
and mili tary bl oc ks to undermi ne Yug osl avi a as a soci ali st or/ and a non-alig ned nati on. Si xth, the
sharp tone of c hurc hes' pol emic s have gi ven the state the i mpressi on that athei sm and athei sts are
thei r sworn enemi es, to bl ame for all the evil s i n soci ety. Churc hes woul d do well to make an effort
ei ther to show that they are i nnoc ent of these c harg es or to mend thei r ways.
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As i s to be expec ted, c hurc hes (and religi ous c ommuni ti es i n g eneral) have a somewhat
di fferent li st of unresolved i ssues wi th respec t to thei r relati on to the state.
Fi rst, there i s the problem ofi nc onsi stenc y i n enforc ement of exi sti ng laws. Yug oslav laws
wi th respec t to religi ous c ommuni ti es may c onsti tute one of the most favorable sets of law i n any
Eastern European soci ali st c ountry. But the c harac ter of a soci ety i s not determi ned merely by i ts
leg al provi si ons, but also by the ways i n whic h these provi si ons are translated i nto prac tic e.42 AI -
thoug h the si tuati on has beenc onsi stentlyi mprovi ng over the years, one sti ll occ asi onally enc ounters
abuses of authori ty especi ally at the loc al level i n the i mplementati on or noni mplementati on of
laws.43 Suc h abuse seems oftenc ondoned by the hig her authori ti es. R egi ons di fferg reatly, however,
wi th respec t to nonenforc ement of the laws bec ause of the di fferent leg aci es i n the relati on of loc al
g overnment offici als wi th religi ous c ommuni ti es i n vari ous regi ons.
Sec ond, religi ous c ommuni ti es fi nd i t hig hly problematic that the P rog ram of the Yug oslav
Communi st Leag ue-- the leadi ng forc ei n the poli tic al li fe of the nati on- -oblig es Communi sts to fig ht
"ag ai nst religi ous and other ki nds of supersti ti ons."

Even thoug h public offici als do state that

"athei sm i s not a basic and essenti al c onsti tuent of Marxi sm" and that "athei zati on . . . i s not deci si ve
for soci ali stic development,"44 the wordi ng of the P rog ram gi ves thei mpressi on that the strugg le for
aboli ti on of religi on i s an i nali enable part of the strugg le for a soci ali st soci ety. R eflec ti ng on the

P rog ram's statements on religi on, R oman Catholic theologi an Tomi slav Sagi -Bunic asks:

Would i t be an exagg erati on to say that I have the i mpressi on that we are sti ll i n the
Mi ddle Ag es i nventi ng ways to eli mi nate effec ti vely "heretic s," or at least i n the
peri od after the Aug sburg P eac e ac knowledgi ng that other soci eti es c an have a
di fferent atti tude on the questi on of religi on, but here we are i n power, so our
atti tude i s normati ve and i n the P rog ram we are explai ni ng how to g et ri d of those
who have problems wi th our vi ews on religi on?45
I f freedom of religi on i s an undi sputed ac hi evement i n the proc ess of ci vi li zati on, then a neg ati ve
valuati on of religi ous beli ef i n the prog ram of a party i s c ertai nly "a laggi ng behi nd i n the advanc e
of ci vi li zati on."46
I mportant attempts have been made, however, to rei nterpret the formulati on of the P rog ram.
I n a rec enti ntervi ew wi th a leadi ng P rotestant monthly a topg overnment offici ali n Croati a, Vi tomi r
Unkovic , i ndic ated that the phrase need not be i nterpreted to i mply that all religi ous beli efs are
supersti ti ons, but that there are religi ous as well as other ki nds of supersti ti ons whic h religi ous
people, no less than Communi sts, have an i nterest i n fig hti ng 4
. 7 Suc h an i nterpretati on of the
P rog ram would then i mply, i n the words of J osi p V rhovec , a member of the P resi di um of the
Yug oslav Communi st Leag ue, that Communi sts "c annot and should not ask ci ti zens who have
si nc erely and wi th dedic ati on joi ned the bui ldi ng of soci ali sm to renounc e thei r religi on."48 But
affi rmati ons of the acc eptabi li ty of religi on i n soci ali st soci ety need to be uttered more forc efully
so that they c an be heard c learly at all levels of g overnment and by the public .
Thi rd, despi te the c onsti tuti onal proc lamati on of equal rig hts of all ci ti zens i rrespec ti ve of
thei r religi ous persuasi ons, beli evers have only il mi ted acc ess to sig ni fic ant soci al and g overnmen10

tal posi ti ons.

As Zdenko R oter poi nts out, "empi ric al i nvestig ati ons have shown li mi tati ons of

religi ous freedoms especi ally i n the advanc ement i n the poli tic al c areers of beli evers, i n the
upbri ngi ng and educ ati on, i n the Yug oslav P eople's Army, and i n the mass medi a. Marxi sm sti ll
func ti ons as a preferred i deolog y."49 Thi s i mpli es that althoug h the acc eptanc e of athei sti c Marxi st
i deolog y i s leg ally c onsi dered a pri vate affai r of i ndi vi duals, i n prac tic e i ti s treated muc h less as a
pri vate affai r of i ndi vi duals than i s religi ous beli ef.50
O nec an se. e the "non- pri vac y" or soci al preferenc e of athei sm partic ularlyc learlyi n two areas
besi des the prac tic e of di sc ri mi nati on ag ai nst beli evers i n employment and promoti on. Fi rst, the
educ ati onal system i s ac ti vely promoti ng athei sm.

I t i s g enerally rec og ni zed that beli evers c an be

.c ompetent and honest workers andi ntellec tuals and that the future of soci ali sm and of soci ali st state
does not depend on athei sm. Why then forc e athei sm i n sc hools ag ai nst the preferenc e of the
majori ty?51 Sec ond, a nec essary prerequi si te for membershi pi n the leadi ng forc e of the poli tic al li fe
of the c ountry, the Communi st P arty, i s the professi on of athei sm.

That i mpli es that beli evers-- a

majori ty of the populati on - -c an play only a sec ondary rolei n the poli tic al li fe of the c ountry. Does
not the c onsti tuti onally g uaranteed equali ty of beli evers and athei sts demand that the state be
separated as c onsi stently from athei st i deolog y as i t i s from religi ous beli ef?52
Fourth, religi ous c ommuni ti es are di sc ontent about the way i n whic h separati on between
c hurc h and state and the pri vac y of religi on are i nterpreted. For the most part they affi rm these
pi llars of ci vi li zed li fe i n a plurali stic soci ety. But for them the separati on ofc hurc h and state and
the pri vac y of religi on mean only that, on the one hand, religi ous li fe i s freed from the juri sdic ti on
of the ci vi l g overnment, and that, on the other hand, the c hurc h acc epts the autonomy of the
poli tic al sphere and renounc es any c lai ms to poli tic al power.53 But they i nsi st that the pri vac y of
religi on i s not synonymous wi th di sap pearanc e of religi on from the public sc ene.
For one, by i ts very public exi stenc e as a c ommuni ty of beli evers, the c hurc h has soci al
i nfluenc e.54 I n most soci ali st soci eti es-- exc epti ons are Albani a and possi bly North Korea-
g overnments have rec og ni zed and acc epted some soci al role of religi on even beyond the soci al
c onsequenc es of i ts sheer exi stenc e.55 Legi slati on on the pri vac y of religi on c annot be c onsi stently
appli ed i f i t i mpli es more than barri ng religi ous c ommuni ti es from public ly di sc ussi ng soci al and
poli tic al c onc erns and i n thi s way i nfluenci ng g overnment polici es.
But Chri sti ans have another reason why they c annot acc ept a di sappearanc e of religi on from
the public sc ene: i ti s thei nali enable soci al di mensi on of the Chri sti an fai thi tself. For what "c ounts"
i n Chri sti an fai th i s not merely fai th, but "fai th expressi ng i tself throug h love" (Gal 5:6).

The

Chri sti an c hurc h c annot be true to i tself and di spense wi th evang eli zi ng about salvati on by fai th i n
Chri st.

For i t beli eves that the eternal desti ny of human bei ng s i s at stake.

And as Albrec ht

Sc hO nherr, a Bi shop of the Evang elic al Churc h i n GDR , rig htly stresses, nei ther c an the c hurc h
di spense wi th "prophesyi ng i n the servic e of the whole human org ani sm, when what i s at stake i s
human li fe and dig ni ty."56
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Finally, the interpretation of the freedom of relig ion is an unresolved issue. Two aspec ts of
the issues are g enerally disc ussed.

The first revolves around the question of the nature of the

freedom g uaranteed by thec onstitutional provision on the freedom of relig ion. I n their relation with

soc ial institutions in Yug oslavia (as in other soc ialist soc ieties) believers are often unsure "whether
their personal relig ious attitudes are protec ted permanently as something g ood, or merely strateg ic ally
bec ause they c annot be forbidden."57 Authentic freedom of relig ion c annot mean that relig ion is
merely tolerated; it must mean that it is truly respec ted.58
The sec ond aspec t of the problem c onc erning relig ious freedoms revolves around the nature
of the religion whose freedom is c onstitutionally g uaranteed. For Christians freedom of relig ion

c annot mean merely freedom of belief (as the offic ial interpretation seems to imply), but freedom
of the believer to live out in an unhindered way all the dimensions of her life as a believer. I t must

be freedom not only to acc ept c ertain relig ious beliefs but also to ac t in acc ordanc e with their moral
implic ations without deliberately neg ative soc ial c onsequenc es for the believer. "The freedom of
relig ion ensured by ourc onstitution must mean the freedom of . .. c reed whic h the believer ac tually
believes and not the freedom of some relig ion whic h a non-believer imputes to a believer and then
interprets what he/ she imputed."59 Of c ourse, no soc iety that wants to promote .human well-being
will allow unrestric ted freedoms for adherents of just any and every relig ious belief. To g ive a
drastic example, a relig ion whic h requires human sac rific es c ould never expec t its freedoms to be
g uaranteed. I n a pluralistic soc iety Christian faith- -as any other ideolog y- -c an enjoy full freedoms
only to the extent that it does not interfere with the freedoms of others (whether they are relig ious
or not) and promotes truly humane values.
V. Mutually Enriching Coexistence?

To the extent that both Christian believers and g overnments of soc ialist soc ieties acc ept the
well-being of hu mans as a basic value they will be able to find solutions to these (and other)
unresolved issues and learn to respec t one another despite their differenc es. Soc ialist soc ieties need
to persuade Christians (and other relig ious people) that soc ialist values are not essentially atheistic
but that "man is the beg inning and end"60 of their strugg le for liberation. And althoug h Christians
will always c onfess God as their hig hest value, they will do well to remind themselves c ontinually
and to assure their soc ialist neig hbors of their belief that the inc arnation makes human being s the
measure, thoug h not of all thing s, but c ertainly of a humane soc iety.6 1
To be sure, Marxist humanism is not identic al with Christian humanism. H enc e their visions
of a humane soc iety will differ. I t mig ht be possible, as Fidel Castro rec ently stated, "to be Marx
ist withoutc easing to be a Christian."6 2 Christians will, however, be able to ag ree with this statement
only under c arefully defined c onditions: Marxists would have to acc ept revisions of Marx' theory
in three important areas.63
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(I) They would not have to c onc ede that two aspec ts of Marx' critique of religion are not
essential to Marxism: his theory that relig ion is only a human produc t, the God of Jesus Christ only
a human projec tion, and his seeming ly g eneral c harg e that relig ion is the opiate of the people.
(2) Marxists would have to revise one important aspec t of Marx' anthropology: they would

have to treat as acc idental to Marxism Marx' persuasion th at dependenc e on God's g rac e is
inc ompatible with human freedom.
(3) As reg ards to Marx's theory of emancipation, Marxists would have tog ive up the universal

requirement of methodic al atheism whic h requires human being s in all their pursuits to ac t "as if
there were no God." Suc h atheism is inc ompatible with some c entral aspec ts of the Christian doc 
trine of salvation.
Thesec onditions for the fullc ompatibility of Marxism and the Christian faith are very stric t.
Not many Marxists will be willing or able to satisfy them. But thesec onditions need not be satisfied
before Christians and Marxists c an start dialog uing · about their respec tive beliefs andc ooperating on
the projec t of more humane soc ieties. For importantc onverg enc es in their understanding of human
being s and humane soc iety already exist.64 Thesec onverg enc es are the basis on whic h Marxists and
Christians in soc ialist soc ieties should strive to ac hieve a c reative and mutually enric hing synthesis
between the authentic Marxist and Christian soc ial vision65 The succ ess of suc h a synthesis and of
the c ommon soc ial projec t based on it will in part depend on the willing ness of both Christians and
Marxists to g ive up all c laims to ideolog ic al monopoly.
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